The recent security treaty between Indonesia and Australia has sparked interest and raised questions. A tale of two nations, each with their own agenda, has led to an intriguing diplomatic dance.
The last security agreement between these nations, the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), ended in disappointment. The new Treaty of Common Security echoes this past, but with a crucial difference: it’s driven by strategic necessity, not political optics.
The AMS was a political move, designed to look good on paper. For Australia, it was an election year tactic, and for Indonesia, it was a friendly gesture. However, it lacked the substance to build trust and was effectively dead by the late 1990s. The final nail in the coffin came when Australia’s decision to intervene in East Timor post-referendum violence clashed with Jakarta’s expectations.
Fast forward to today, and the new treaty is a different beast. It’s a stronger commitment than an agreement, with ambitions to elevate consultation to the leader level. This time, both leaders and their foreign ministers were directly involved, shaping a treaty that reflects their shared interests.
But here’s where it gets controversial: the treaty is about preserving agency. For Australia, it’s a growing desire for a more independent foreign policy, still allied to Washington but less dependent. For Indonesia, it’s a matter of strategic survival, navigating the erratic behavior of great powers and the rising influence of China.
And this is the part most people miss: the treaty is not just about security. It’s about economic ties and the challenge of balancing deep economic relationships with China while limiting its coercive influence. As the US-China competition intensifies, East Asian states are seeking autonomy and agency.
The treaty with Indonesia, a non-aligned state, is a unique moment. It’s as close as Indonesia has ever come to an alliance, enabled by a rare window of opportunity during a time of great power coercion. The relationship is dependent on the evolving dynamics and the fulfillment of tacit expectations.
The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), which the AMS was modeled after, began as a commitment to consultation. The new treaty, however, is grounded in an assumption of an interdependent security ecosystem, where each side’s security is linked to the other’s. This means avoiding actions that might make the partner feel insecure.
Can Indonesia trust Australia to prioritize their partnership over Washington? Can Australia trust a partner that doesn’t view China as a strategic threat? These are the questions that hang over the treaty.
For Australia, the expectation is that Indonesia will reinforce shared interests and abstain from undermining Australia’s efforts to preserve regional order. In return, Canberra must consult and respect Indonesia’s sovereignty. The challenge is whether closer defense ties will require deeper trade and investment with a country seen as too close to Beijing.
For Indonesia, the expectation is that Australia will act as a dependable security partner, even under Washington’s pressure, and that engagement will support Jakarta’s strategic autonomy beyond defense. Jakarta also expects respect for its non-alignment and keeping its waters out of potential war theaters. The challenge is whether this partnership will deliver tangible economic gains.
The shadow of East Timor looms large, reminding Indonesia of Australia’s unreliability. Even today, suggestions of a Status of Forces Agreement meet strong resistance.
The importance of trust is often overstated, especially in uncertain times when interests take priority. This treaty is a story of two countries choosing their own interests, and this time, agency preservation brings them together. The real test will be whether both sides meet their tacit expectations and bear the political costs that come with it.